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Abstract 
This paper critically analyses a potential regulation of Credit Rating Agencies in New 
Zealand - in light of the financial crisis - from a public law perspective. The main focus 
of this research is on the question, whether indeed a comprehensive regulation is 
indicated, or alternatively, whether the power of the markets is able to cope efficiently 
and sufficiently with the inherent issues of providing credit ratings; in other words, this 
paper deals with the clash of regulation v self-regulation. 
Word length 
The text of this paper (excluding abstract, table of contents,footnotes and bibliography) 
comprises approximately 14,900 words. 
Subjects and Topics 
Regulation - self-regulation - New Zealand's regulation on credit rating agencies -
public duty and power to step in to regulate - consumer rights - protection of the 
financial markets - national and global requirements - IOSCO Code of Conduct -
comparison of New Zealand, United States, Australian and European regulation of 
credit rating agencies. 
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I Introduction 
This paper will examine whether the regulation of Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs)' m 
New Zealand is necessa1y. Although this topic is, in particular, tightly linked to economic 
issues, the author will closely look at it from a public law perspective. 
At first glance, CRAs seem to be alien for most of the people. Only people who work in 
the financial sector may exactly know what the role of CRAs is. The remaining part, like 
the ordinary consumer, has not the slightest idea of CRAs, their tasks and their meaning 
for national as well as for international financial systems. This situation is far from 
desirable, as the work of CRAs surrounds and affects consumers almost every day. In 
fact, CRAs are essential market participants of the national and international financial 
markets. Governments have not considered their regulation necessary for a long time, 
even though they have a significant impact on the financial markets, governments, 
companies, consumers and the modem welfare. 2 Instead, particularly, (investment) banks 
and securities finns were facing more and enhanced regulation by governments.3 
Regardless of these measures, the latest global financial c1isis has occurred. This crisis 
has given cause to consider the financial markets differently. Both governments at a 
national level and international organizations all over the world are scrntinising 
intensively the financial markets and their pm1icipants. This scrutiny is taking place to 
identify the main culp1its and problems of the financial crisis as well as to prevent similar 
crises in the future. A comprehensive refo1m and review should eventually lead to an 
understandable and secure investment environment, thus to more financial stability. The 
intention is to improve mm·ket transparency, and in addition, to enhance the present 
control mechanisms significantly. Therefore goals and measures, which most of the 
Governments have laid down to cope with the financial crisis, include an enhanced 
control of market participants and certain investment products.4 The regulation of CRAs 
CRA is hereinafter used as an abbreviation for Credit Rating Agency. 
Amadou N R Sy 'The Systemic Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies and Rated Markets" (2009) 
!MF Working Paper 129 at 8; Josef Forster "The Optimal Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies" 
(2008) Ludwig-Maximilians-Universitaet Muenchen 14 at 1 < www.epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de>. 
See, inter alia, Stefan Handke "Yes, we Can (Control Them)! - Regulatory Agencies: Trustees or 
Agents? (20 I 0) 2 GoJIL 1, 111 , at 112 and as an example the United States Dodd- Frank Wall 
Sa·eet Refonn and Consumer Protection Act. 
Re erve Bank of New Zealand "Financial Stability Repo1i' ' (November 2009) RBNZ at 41 
<www.rbnz.govt.nz>; compare also Tin A Bunjevac "Credit Rating Agencies: A regulatory 
challenge for Australia" (AGIS Plus Text, Melbourne, 2009) at 40. 
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is often among these goals and measures .5 Though New Zealand has not yet announced 
concrete measures. 
Apparently, many governments do not consider self-regulation as an adequate option to 
deal with the problems that have atisen. The traditional notion, that markets can deal with 
their problems themselves, seems to be thrown entirely overboard. This is, probably, 
justified by the vigorous impact of the financial crisis on the global economy and the 
national mat·kets. Thus, it might be a mistake of the New Zealand Government to delay or 
not undertake at all the regulation of CRAs. 
However, this paper will try to find an answer to this question. Part II of this paper gives 
the background to this, admittedly, alien and complex topic , by explaining the basic terms 
and the development of CRAs. Jn the key part, part III, the author will specifically 
examine the clash of regulation and self-regulation. Starting from the most recent IOSCO 
Code of Conduct for CRAs and the cmTent New Zealand approach, the paper 
concentrates on the distinct features of regulation and self-regulation as well as the rights 
at stake. The consideration of international obligations and requirements will then be 
subject of pat1 IV. The compatison of New Zealand ' s approach to the United States, the 
European Union, the implementation in the United l(jngdom, and Australia ' s current 
approach will be of a special interest. I will conclude with proposing new regulation of 
CRAs, being justified by significant risks for the entire New Zealand and global financial 
system as well as considerable consumer rights at stake. 
II Background 
A proper understanding of the topic, which is embedded in the financial markets, requires 
the definition of the basic tenns. In addition, I will outline briefly the business of CRAs 
and their contribution to the Subprime Crisis.6 
A Basic Terms 
Essential for the consideration of the following issues a1·e the terms "regulation", 
particularly " financial regulation", "mat·kets" and "financial markets", " issuer" and 
"investor". 
6 
Bunjevac, above n 4, at 40 ; Sy, above n 2, a t 6,7, 21-29 . 
The Subprime Cris is is ex plained under II 8 3. 
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1 Regulation and.financial regulation 
The te1m "regulation" can have very different meanings. Therefore, here, the lines are 
drawn clearly to identify the relevant meaning. 
"Regulation" describes, from an abstract perspective, the act of regulating, or, in other 
words, an authoritative rnle, whereby the exercise of control or governance is laid down. 7 
For purposes of this paper, regulation has to be understood in that sense. 
In fact, regulation is omnipresent. Well-known areas of regulation are health and safety 
regulation, social policy regulation, economic regulation, particularly antitrust, energy, 
electricity, transpo11, key industries as the media and environmental regulation.8 Most 
striking is that these areas are highly sensitive in terms of vulnerable consumers, weak 
market participants and services of general interest. Usually, if Governments ascertain a 
significant imbalance in, among others, these areas, they react by seeking for appropriate 
regulation. 
Having defined the te1m "regulation", the in the context of this paper more relevant te1m 
"financial regulation" requires intensive consideration. Financial regulation allegedly 
differs from ordinary regulation. Three distinctive features have been identified.9 
First, financial regulation often includes the establishment of official regulators with wide 
powers. Regularly regulators are established to strengthen the outcome of regulation. 
Normally, these regulators combine legislative, judicial and executive functions. Reasons 
for their establishment are, inter alia, the wish for a decentralised government, but on the 
other hand the closeness of governments to the regulated area. Special knowledge of 
regulators, consisting of expe11s in the specific area, will lead to the desired closeness. 
The US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) might be the most famous financial 
regulator. The New Zealand counterpai1 for investments is, cun-ently, the Securities 
Commission. 
9 
See and compare Regulations (Disallowance) Act 1989 , s 2; see also Julia Black "Law and 
Regulation: The Case of Finance" in Christine Parker, Colin Scott, Nicola Lacey and others ( eds) 
in Regulating Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004) 33 at 34. 
Philip R Wood Regulation of International Finance (Sweet & Maxwel I, London, 2007) at [2-0 I OJ; 
see also Marc Schneiberg and Tim Bartley "Organizations, Regulation, and Economic Behavior: 
Regulatory Dynamic and Forms from the Nineteenth to Twenty-First Century" (2008) 
AnnuRevLawSocSci 31 at 34 and 38 with regard to the " new social regulation". 
Wood, above n 8, at [20-01]. 
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The second distinctive feature of financial regulation is a tendency towards the 
criminalisation of commercial law, for instance regulatory fines or investigative powers 
are provided for cases of misconduct. Imminent punishments aim at easing enforcement 
and increasing the dete1Tent effect for providers of financial services. Having said this, in 
contrast to administrative measures , where regularly the notion of compensation 
dominates, c1iminal law is intended to function as a deterrent and punishment. 10 
Thirdly, a high degree of specific and accurate codification characterises financial 
regulation. Due to the often complex issues of financial regulation, appropriate 
codification is a fundamental requirement. As explained above, special regulators are 
established to deal with the emerging problems. They usually carry out a legislative 
function. This legislative function can give power to enact binding rules as well as soft 
law. In light of the special knowledge, which these regulators typically have, the 
delegation of this power makes sense. Furthermore, this delegation aims at increasing 
speed, flexibility and accessibility, by simultaneously reducing costs. Rules can be ve1y 
detailed which, on the one hand, means an advantage for regulated firms. As a result they 
can easily grasp the content of these mles and comply with them, without stmggling with 
their interpretation. On the other hand though, this detailed approach bears the risks of 
being too specific and , eventually, of over-regulation. 11 
Financial regulation has increased recently, mostly targeting at banks, insurance 
companies and brokers, as the worldwide financial had exposed a s ignificant lack of 
regulation of these institutions.12 This increase is taking place in order to restore the 
stability of financial markets in a sustainable manner. 13 As financial stability is the main 
goal of financial regulation, an impressive amount of foreign financial protection systems 
has been established.14 
10 
II 
12 
13 
14 
Ibid , at [20-04]. 
See and compare ibid , at [20-0 I ] - [20-06]. 
See above n 3. 
Rainer Grote and Thi lo Marauhn ( eds) The Regulation of In ternational Financial Markets 
Perspectives fo r Reform (Cambridge Uni versity Press, Cambridge, 2006) at 324 . 
Anup Shah "Global Financial Crisi "(22 August 20 10) Global Issues < www.globalissues.org>; 
Dick K Nanto "The Global Financ ial Cris is: Analys is and Poli cy Implica tions" (2 October 2009) 
Congressional Research Service 7-5700 RL3 474 2 <www.crs.gov> . 
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2 Markets and financial markets 
CRAs act as participants of "markets", and more specifically, of "financial markets". 
Consumers are permanently swrnunded by markets in many different guises. 
Historically, sellers and buyers met at a marketplace. Sellers offered their goods at a 
certain price, waiting for buyers who bargained for the goods. If they settled on the 
amount of goods and the appropriate price for the goods, then goods and money were 
exchanged, and the deal was made. The places, where numerous of these deals were 
made can be refeJTed to as markets.15 
Today, the grasp of markets differs significantly from this traditional view. Marketplaces 
in the historical sense are rare, whereas markets are now detennined by delocalisation. 
Deals are made online in the cyberspace, over the phone, by mail or by other means. The 
modem means of communication have contributed to the new understanding of markets. 
Simultaneously markets are becoming increasingly less transparent. Sellers and buyers 
are often not at the same place or even not in the same country or the same continent. 
Traded products are more complex and more expensive. As a consequence adequate 
regulation has been required to deal with these issues and imbalances in bargaining 
power. However, the focus is still on the underlying principle of exchange. 
This principle also fits for roughly characterising financial markets. The notion of giving 
good A to a person C and getting good B from C in return is for financial markets 
fundamental , even if it is embedded in a complex set of facts and issues and therefore less 
likely to be easily understood. Financial markets can be formal stock exchanges for 
equity shares, fonnal 'over-the-counter' markets for many sorts of financial assets, the 
interbank deposit markets and foreign exchange markets. 16 
3 Issuer of investment products 
The third impo11ant term that needs further explanation is " issuer". An issuer of 
investment products can be described as a "legal entity (such as a corporation) that is 
authorized to issue (offer for sale) its own securities". 17 Securities are, for example, 
investment products such as stocks and bonds. Banks are well known issuer of these 
products. 
15 
16 
I 7 
Compare David S Clark ( ed) Encyc/opedia of Lall'&Societ_v American and Global Perspecti1'e 
(SAGE Publications, London, 2007) vol 2 at 985. 
Wood, above n 8 , at [20-19) . 
Definition Issuer <www .businessdictionary.com>; see also Financial Reporting Act 1993, s 4 and 
the Securities Act 1978 , s 2. 
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4 Investor 
Of particular relevance for this paper is the "investor". A sound definition of an investor 
is: is 
[a]n individual who commits money to investment products with the expectation of 
financial return. Generally, the primary concern of an investor is to minimize risk 
while maximizing return , as opposed to a speculator, who is willing to accept a 
higher level of risk in the hopes of collecting higher-than-average profits . 
This definition roughly draws the picture of an individual consumer . Yet, it is obvious 
that companies like banks, insurance companies and pension funds , and even entire 
states, belong to the group of investors. 19 
B Development of Credit Rating Agencies 
The role of CRAs as participants in the financial markets has become significantly 
stronger during the past few years. To understand the role of CRAs and their increased 
significance, this paper will outline the business of CRAs first, before shedding some 
light on the market leaders among CRAs and their contribution to the Subprime C1isis. 
I The Business of Credit Rating Agencies 
What is the business of CRAs actually about? Generally, their business is concerned with 
risk assessment, which serves as a 1isk indicator for investors and other market 
participants. One of the CRAs' major task is to provide credit ratings, among others, for 
banks and insurance companies, whose customers are, to a large extent, consumers. 
Consumers wish to invest or save their money in a sustainable way, or to obtain proper 
insurance cover. Credit ratings can help to reach this goal. However, a distinction is made 
between solicited and unsolicited ratings. In the latter case, CRAs conduct these ratings 
on their own initiative or due to the mandate of a third pa1ty, such as governments or 
investors. In this case, an issuer of an investment product, for example, is not required to 
disclose any infonnation. As a result an unsolicited rating bears generally the risk, that 
CRAs have to rely on publicly available infomrntion and the rating is too vague.20 
JC) 
20 
Definition Investor <www.investorwords.com>. 
See Interpretations in Investment Advisers (Disclosure) Act 1996, s 2. 
Uwe Blaurock "Control and Responsibility of Credit Rating Agencies" (2007) 11 .3 EJCL I . 
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The relevant legislation in New Zealand requires New Zealand's banks and insurance 
companies to obtain credit ratings from CRAs on a regular basis.21 Those credit ratings 
are, in particular, supposed to provide a simple means for consumers, to understand the 
banks ' and insurance companies' creditworthiness at first sight. Hence, they also fulfill a 
regulato1y purpose. 22 One might rightly ask, why that is important. The answer is, that 
even banks and insurance companies can sail into rough seas, or considering a worst case 
scenario, go bankrupt, which may, in absence of appropriate safeguards , lead to losses of 
money, pensions and insurance claims for many consumers. When deciding on a bank or 
an insurance company, consumers should pay sufficient attention to the present credit 
rating. An average consumer should be capable to assess the rating, as credit ratings in 
consumer information usually are in the following format , accompanied by a short 
explanation: 23 
Credit Risk Moody's Standard and Poor 's Fitch Ratings 
Investment Grade 
Highest Qua Ii ty Aaa AAA AAA 
High Quality Aa AA AA 
Upper Medium A A A 
Medium Baa BBB BBB 
Not Inves tment Grade 
Lower Medium Ba BB BB 
Lower Grade B B B 
Poor Grade Caa CCC CCC 
Speculative Ca cc cc 
No Payments / Bankruptcy C D C 
In Default C D D 
Grades for creditworthiness are given, reaching from 'Aaa' / ' AAA' for the highest level 
to 'C' / 'D' for default/insolvency.24 Even without the understanding of the specific 
meaning of the credit rating, evidently, a very high rating, such as an AAA, differs from 
a medium BBB rating. Due to a common lack of financial literacy, however, consumers 
often do not understand these credit ratings and , in addition, are prone to underestimate 
the effect of credit ratings in daily life. 25 Sellers of investment products are usually also 
not inclined to point out the meaning of a specific credit rating. 
2 I 
22 
24 
25 
Reserve Bank ofNew Zealand Amendment Act 2008 , s 17 subs 157 1-K; Insurance Companies 
(Ratings and lnspecti ons) Act 1994. 
Compare ibid . 
Money-Zine.com <www.money-zine.com/Investing/Investing/Bond-Ratings/>. 
Compare above table, CRAs use distinct grade sys tems, which are easil y comparable though. 
See lll C I (b) below; Wood, above n 8, at [20-22] and [20-24]. 
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Another important task of CRAs is to provide credit ratings for specific investment 
products, such as bonds (forms of loans). As aforementioned, investors thereby receive a 
single measure to calculate risks as to their own investments.26 Widdowson and Wood 
characterise this as the estimated likelihood that the issuer of an investment product will 
be able to meet all its financial obligations on time.27 That means, with regard to the 
bond, whether the bond is likely to be repaid by the debtor or whether the issuer of an 
investment product will default or is expected to default. 28 
An example will make it easier for the reader to understand both the practical issues and, 
from a legal perspective, the more interesting cry for regulation. The investor, having 
saved $10,000 NZD, is contacted by the banker, suggesting a possibility to increase the 
interest rate on the savings. The banker recommends a particular investment product: a 
bond issued by a distressed company ("the Company") in Greece, promising a return on 
investment of 8% for one year. The Company borrows the investor's money for one year 
in order to improve its own liquidity. It promises the investor that he/she will get the 
money back at the end of the term, plus interest at the rate of 8%. The investor is 
delighted as that could facilitate the next trip to the Cook Islands, gaining more than the 
market standard 1 % or 2% interest rate on the savings. Furthermore, the banker tells the 
investor that the bond is AAA (triple A) rated, which allegedly stands for a very secure 
investment. Further information in tenns of the rating and, in particular, its meaning and 
potential risks is not provided. The investor has therefore not received any info1mation, 
other than the current rating, about the bond issuer's creditworthiness. Not being aware of 
the Company's ability to pay the money plus the interest rate back, a proper risk 
calculation is almost impossible for the lending investor. 
Moreover, credit ratings are also used to dete1mine the creditworthiness of states, 
governments as well as the above mentioned companies.29 
In fact, CRAs have taken on a lot of different responsibilities which affect, pai1icularly, 
other market pai1icipants (such as investors), financial markets and states. Other market 
pai1icipants and many regulators have applied credit ratings to cany out their risk 
26 
27 
28 
29 
Doug Widdowson and Andy Wood "A user's guide to credit ratings" (2008) 71 (3) RBNZ 
Bulletin 56. 
Ibid. 
Wood, above n 8, at [2-015] ; also Blaurock, above n 20, ibid. 
See Blaurock, above n 20, at 2; Shahla Motadel ''C redit ratings: opinion on credit quality" ( 1996) 
59(2) RBNZ Bulletin 142; for instance NZ banks are required to have a cutTent credit rating. 
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assessment of, inter alia, investments, by relying largely upon credit ratings. Indeed, 
CRAs fulfill an important task as providers of information. Therefore, often highlighted 
benefits of the work of CRAs are: first, they facilitate an independent 1isk assessment, 
secondly, they provide information for investors and other market participants in a simple 
and comprehensive manner, and, thirdly, they contribute to an improvement of 
institutions' stability by enabling these institutions to strengthen their risk assessment.30 
The strong market position of CRAs as well as the inherent deficits of the credit rating 
process might overshadow these benefits. Along with the provision of information, CRAs 
have lately gained a strong influence on financial markets. Incorrect or delayed ratings by 
big CRAs can lead to significant economic consequences, for example, Standard & 
Poor's Ratings Services downgraded Greece at a point in time, when the bad financial 
situation there had been well known for a long time. 31 Nevertheless, the downgrade, in 
particular, worsened the value of the European cuJTency (Euro) heavily and impaired the 
European financial markets, such as the stock exchanges.32 These so-called rating c1ises 
are not uncommon. "[U]nanticipated and abrupt credit rating downgrades" have occutTed 
before the current crisis. 33 Apparently, like many consumers who have problems to 
understand credit ratings, even financial expe1ts and entire governments cannot inte1pret 
credit ratings coITectly. They ignore other available data, like the infonnation with regard 
to the economic situation in Greece, and rely primarily on credit ratings. 
Fmthennore, the credit rating process bears some inherent deficits, such as conflicts of 
interest, a lack of transparency and effectiveness.34 Even before the recent financial c1isis, 
financial expe1ts had raised c1iticism with regard to these deficits. 15 The author will 
examine them in-depth in patt III, as they take centre stage when considering the clash of 
regulation and self-regulation of CRAs. In addition, this paper h·ies to point out a solution 
as to providing a transpat·ent and effective credit rating process. Finding approp1iate 
approaches becomes more and more imp01tant. I will underline the significance of 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
Widdowson and Wood, above n 26, at 61. 
Roya Wolverson "The Credit Rating Controversy'' (4 June 2010) Council on Foreign Relations 
<www.cfr.org>. 
The Financial Regulation Forum "Europe-wide oversight of credit rating agencies" ( 4 June 20 I 0) 
<www.financialregulationforum.com>; Andrew Bowen "European Commission plans reform of 
rating agency regulation" (2 June 2010) Deutsche Welle <www.dw-world.de>. 
Sy, above n 2, at 3. 
Thomas Lee Hazen Principles of Securities Regulation (3rd ed, Thomson/West, St. Paul , 
2009) at 333-334. 
See, in particular, IOSCO Code of Conduct (revised May 2008) and Regulation I 060/2009 on 
credit rating agencies [2009] OJ L 302. 
13 The Regul ati on of Credit Rating Agencies in ew Zealand rrom a Public Law Perspecti ve 
implementing proper regulation by explaining, how CRAs have contributed to the 
financial crisis:16 
2 The market leaders 
The most important CRAs and simultaneously the market leaders are Standard & Poor's 
Ratings Services (based in the United States), Moody 's Investors Service Limited (based 
in the United States) and Fitch Ratings (French owned). Two other significant CRAs are 
A M Best (based in the United States), being specialised in the insurance area, and 
Canada 's Dominion Bond Rating Service. In fact , the market leaders control around 90-
95 % of the market. These big three, usually referred to as oligopolists, definitely 
dominate the global credit rating market:17 It is apparent, they play an impo11ant role in 
New Zealand as well. On the other hand , all of the market leaders are non-New Zealand 
companies , even if they are conducting business in New Zealand. The approved CRAs 
for (credit) rating banks in New Zealand are, however, the big three.38 
In order to underline the worldwide importance of CRAs, the following figures assist. In 
2009, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services published more than 870,000 new and revi sed 
credits ratings. Cu1Tently, they rate more than US$32 trillion in outstanding debt. 39 
Moody's says that its ratings and analysis track debt covering more than 100 sovereign 
nations, 12,000 corporate issuers, 29,000 public finance issuers and 96,000 structured 
finance obligations.4° Fitch Ratings claims that it rates "more financial institutions world-
wide than any other rating agency" .41 
Frankly, it is not possible to ignore the big picture, the nation- and worldwide impact of 
the role and work of CRAs in tenns of the financial markets and the whole financial 
system. 
36 
37 
. 18 
4 1 
European Commiss ion "Commiss ion propo es improved EU supervision of Credit Rating 
Agencies and launches debate on corporate governance in financ ial institutions" (2 June 20 l 0) 
Press Release IP/1 0/656 <www .ec.europa.eu >; Sy, above n 2, at I and 3; Bunjevac, above n 4 , at 
40. 
Blaurock, above n 20, at 5 and 6; European Commiss ion "Pro posa l fo r a Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Counc il on Credit Rating Agencies" (press re lease, 12 N ovember 
2008) SEC(2008) 2745 , SEC(2008) 2746, inter ali a at [1 .2], [1 .3] and [9.6] <www.ec.euro pa.eu > . 
A pp roved by the Reserve Bank , see <www .sec-com.govt.n z/pub lications/documents/> . 
Website Standard & Poor's "About Standard & Poor's History" <www. tandardandpoors.com>. 
Website Moody's "About Moody's" <www. moodys.co m>. 
Website Fitch Ratings "About Us Corporate Brochure" <www. fitchratings.com>. 
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3 Their contribution to the Subprime Crisis and Financial Crisis 
In fact, CRAs have contributed to the recent financial crisis. Financial experts have 
identified them as one of the main culprits of the Subprime C1isis, the origins of which lie 
in the United States and which ve1ifiably initiated the financial ciisis.42 The author will 
prove that assumption by outlining the process of achieving credit ratings and elaborating 
the contribution of CRAs to the Subprime Crisis. 
The figure below shows the basic relations between the main market paiticipants in terms 
of the credit rating process, namely the issuer, the CRA and the investor. It explains 
simply, how a solicited rating for an investment product is usually accomplished. 
Figure 1: 
Issuer 
Advice, preliminary & final rating 
Investment 
Investor 
Credit Rating 
Agency 
Disclosure 
of Rating 
The issuer requests a rating from the CRA (see Figure: I). Usually, a contract is 
concluded between both paities, setting the conditions for caiTying out the work, which 
leads to the rating. Accordingly, the issuer provides infonnation and is obliged to pay the 
CRA; the big three all follow this "issuer pays" business model (see Figure: I ).
4 1 
CoITespondingly the CRA provides advice and delivers a prelimina1y, plus a final rating 
(see Figure: 2). No audit is conducted, though, as people often assume. In contrast to an 
audit process, a mere consultation takes place dwing this process. The CRA advises the 
42 
43 
Bunjevac, above n 4 , at 40-43 ; Blaurock, above n 20, at 26; Sy, above n 2, at 1. 
See Blaurock, above n 20, at 3, 4 and 7, with fur1her references; Wolverson , above n 31 , ibid; 
compare also Sy, above n 2, at 5 with regard to the re liance on information. 
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issuer how to achieve a good rating, but does not analyse the investment product in such 
a depth as an auditor.44 Then, after finalising the rating process, the rating is disclosed by 
the CRA (see Figure 3 ), and often by the issuer, too.45 Based on this rating the investor is 
able to make an investment decision , possibly purchasing the issuer' s investment product 
(see Figure 4). That can happen through a middleman, like the banker in the example, 
given above. 
The Subprime Crisis requires a little more detailed explanation. The following figure 
illustrates the basic relations between the involved market participants. This occurs, by 
highlighting the role of CRAs. 
Figure 2: 
Loan/ 
Mortgage Loans sold 
Home Buyers L-L.::J-,/ Investment 
Bank subprime loans 
1 [:] ~ r-------1 5 Poolingofrisky 
(Subprimers) ~ ~ Bank .__ ____ __.  ,..._ _____ for more profits 
Repayments 
fees 
CRA helps to 
structure 
risky loans 
to get a high 
rating (AAA) 
Credit Rat ing 
Agency 
To understand the circumstances which led to the Subprime Crisis, the author briefly 
describes the usual process of financing a consumer property purchase. Home Buyers in 
the United States, like in any other country in the world , often needed a loan to finance 
their prope1ty purchase. Banks were keen to grant a loan , if the purchaser met ce11ain 
c1iteria. Normally, both paities, the bank and the purchaser, negotiated the terms and 
conditions of the specific loan agreement and the mo1tgage. This usually happened by 
caiTying out a check of the purchaser's income. In addition , the bank assessed the 
45 
See Forster, above n 2, at 22 with fw1h er references. 
Compare with rega rd to the rating process ibid. 
16 The Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies in New Zealand from a Public Law Perspective 
property's value. The assessment took place to determine whether the property was likely 
to be of value in the event of raising a m01tgage claim. 
However, prior to the Subprime Crisis, regularly, banks did not conduct the before 
mentioned income checks and property assessments. Rather banks were inclined to grant 
these loans/mo1igages (see Figure 1, the "Subprime Loans"). Thus, even members of an 
"underprivileged" class could successfully apply for loans/mo1tgages. Those people, 
referred to as "Subp1imers" since the Subprime Crisis, were often on the edge of 
insolvency. According to the specific loan agreements, Home Buyers were required to 
repay the loans (see Figure 2). 
Yet, the question must arise, why banks were so prone to grant loans to people, who 
carried around with themselves a significant likelihood of defaults on repayments. A 
teaser for banks was the fact, that they could sell the repayment claims (referred to as 
loans in Figure 2) for a good profit to investment banks. Accordingly, banks forwarded 
the repayments to the purchaser of the repayment claims (see Figure 3 and 4). That meant 
an enormous advantage for banks, as according to Basel II/III repayment claims need 
usually to have a so1t of underlying collateral (assets) and Basel II/III restricts banks in 
incuning liabilities.46 Hence, by selling the claims, in return, the loans disappeared from 
the banks' balance sheets and banks received fresh money from the purchaser (the 
Investment Bank in the figure) which could subsequently be invested. Investment banks, 
on the other hand, got money from stock exchanges, like the Wall Street, in order to buy 
these risky subprime loans and pool them together as a so1t of bond (see Figure 5). 
Pooling and stmctu1ing these risky loans wisely together required special knowledge and 
the assistance of another market participant - the CRAs. A successful and profitable 
distribution of these bonds required a pretty wrapping, like a high credit rating. This 
pretty wrapping came often along in guise of a AAA rating, which was frequently being 
given to these kinds of risky bonds.47 
CRAs earned healthy fees as an incentive, in exchange for their advice how to stmcture 
these risky loans effectively, in order to receive a high credit rating (see Figure 6 and 7). 
After wrapping up the risky loans nicely, the newly structured bonds could be sold to 
investors (see Figure 8). The return on these bonds was a pait of the repayments on the 
46 
47 
Mar-wan Elkhoury "Credit Rating Agencies and their potential impact on developing countries" 
(January 2008) Discussion Papers United Nations Conference on Trade and Development No 186; 
Compare Basel Committee on Banking Supervision "International regulatory framework for banks 
(Basel III)" <www.bis.org> with further references; Basel II was initially published in 2004. It 
aims at creating international standards for banking and regulators, in particular in relation to an 
assessment of capital , serving as collateral against cases of risks banks take. 
Sy, above n 2,at 16. 
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loans (see Figure 9). Being misled by the high rating and a decent return, investors all 
over the world decided to purchase these bonds. Among them were consumers, banks, 
insurance companies, pension funds and entire governments. 
Initially, in fact all of the before-mentioned involved market participants made a good 
deal from these an-angements. In pa11icular, banks, investment banks and CRAs made a 
good and sustainable deal. Predictably though, a rapidly increasing number of Home 
Buyers was incapable of refinancing the loans. The often weak income situation of the 
"Subprimers" contributed significantly to that fact. As the property as collateral was not 
valuable enough to cover the default in repayments, consequently, more and more 
investors did not receive any return on their bonds. Most of the bonds eventually 
defaulted. In the end, many investors faced trashy bonds and a total loss of their money, 
despite having bought a AAA rated bond. Therefore the impact of that 1isky investment 
hit "Subprimers" and investors first. 
Apparently, though, banks, investment banks and CRAs, had underestimated the potential 
consequences of their actions. Not surp1isingly, the whole financial system was struck by 
the impact of the so-called Subprime Crisis. Investors lost confidence in the financial 
markets, hence, abrnptly, significantly and globally, investment activity declined. In tum, 
this led to illiquidity in the financial markets and a tremendously negative effect on 
economies worldwide and thereby caused the global financial crisis. In addition , for 
understandable reasons , the housing market in the United States and the entire global real 
estate market suffered severely from the Subp1ime Crisis. 
In the aftennath of the Subprime Crisis and the recent Financial Crisis, governments 
increasingly introduced new regulations in relation to the control of banks and investment 
banks.48 In conjunction with this effo11, finally, many governments paid attention to the 
work of CRAs and considered their (comprehensive) regulation necessary. 49 
48 
49 
See above n 3. 
See regulation in the United States: Credit Rating Agency Reform Act 2006; European Union: 
Regulation I 060/2009 on credit rating agencies [2009] OJ L 302; Canada: 25-10 I Designated 
Rating Organizations [NI Proposed]. 
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III Regulation v Self-regulation of CRAs 
CRAs are, except for some unspecific Guidelines, currently not regulated in New 
Zealand.50 After having defined the most relevant financial terms and illustrated the 
business and development of CRAs, the time is ripe to examine the key aspect of this 
paper, namely the clash of regulation and self-regulation. Eventually, after having been 
focused on the regulation of investment banks and other market participants for a fairly 
long time, governments around the world have identified CRAs as a market participant, 
that needs to be regulated.51 New Zealand has not adopted appropriate regulation, or more 
specifically, New Zealand follows the global debate on the regulation of CRAs, but:52 
the Reserve Bank plans to watch the global debate and then adapt new international 
standards as they become clearer, where they seem appropriate to the New Zealand 
financial system. 
Accordingly, the Financial Stability Report 2009 published by the Reserve Bank of New 
Zealand states that "[d]etailed work is under way globally on many issues, including 
rating agency regulation, accounting standards and executive compensation."
53 
The focus of this paper is hence on the following issue in relation to the regulation of 
CRAs: self-regulation by the markets in contrast to the regulation by the Government, by 
balancing inter alia market interests and public interests. The most recent International 
Organizations of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) Code of Conduct Fundamentals for 
Credit Rating Agencies will help to understand the inherent issues of the credit rating 
business. Simultaneously, a vivid example of industry self-regulation by a code of 
conduct is given. 
In order to thoroughly elaborate the issue, then the cmTent New Zealand approach in 
relation to the general use of regulation will be outlined. Thereafter, the author will 
analyse whether there is indeed room for more regulation and shed light on the source of 
public power and the public duty to step in to regulate. Goals of regulation and self-
regulation will also be identified in this regard. 
50 
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See below n 71 . 
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As this paper tries to give a recommendation as to the fu11her regulatory approach of the 
New Zealand Government to cope with CRAs, the rights at stake need to be balanced 
carefully. This occurs by going into detail as to the inherent deficits of credit ratings and 
their meaning for the New Zealand economy. The most crucial issue will be whether an 
omission of regulation significantly jeopardises consumer rights, rights of investors and 
rights of other market participants. Alongside this discussion the author will closely look 
at financial literacy of consumers. In addition, the issue whether there is sufficient 
competition in the markets is of interest. Striving to provide the big picture, this paper 
will also give an answer to possibly impaired tights of CRAs. 
A The IOSCO Code of Conduct Fundamentals for Credit Rating Agencies 
The most interesting piece of self- regulation in relation to CRAs was released even 
before the recent global financial crisis.54 The Technical Committee of the International 
Organizations of Securities Commissions published first in September 2003 a non-
binding Statement of Principles Regarding the Activities of Credit Rating Agencies. 55 
These principles were first not very specific, but, remarkably, as for the first time it was 
dealt with issues in te1ms of CRAs.56 Major issues were addressed, among other things, 
independence and conflicts of interest. Take, for example, principle 2.5, that stated: 
"[t]he dete1mination of a credit rating should be influenced only by factors relevant to the 
credit assessment. "57 In general :58 
... the P1inciples laid out high-level objectives that rating agencies, regulators, 
issuers and other market participants should strive toward in order to improve 
investor protection and the fairness, efficiency and transparency of securities markets 
and reduce systemic risk. 
As a consequence following publications and international expe1ts concentrated on those 
principles and pleaded for a more detailed code of conduct. The result is the cuITent 
IOSCO Code of Conduct Fundan1entals for Credit Rating Agencies (IOSCO Code of 
Conduct), the latest version is from May 2008. 
54 
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Pavlos Maris "The Regulation of credit rating agencies in the US and Europe: hi storical analysi s 
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IOSCO Statement of Principles regarding the Activities of Credit Rating Agencies (25 September 
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The IOSCO Code of Conduct serves as a guide and aims at providing a framework for 
CRAs in different markets and jmisdictions. However, the overarching objective of the 
IOSCO Code of Conduct is "to promote investor protection by safeguarding the integrity 
of the rating process".59 It is evident that risks as to the credit rating process were 
identified and the IOSCO Code of Conduct is meant as a voluntary tool to minimize these 
risks. It patticularly deals with three problematic areas, namely the quality and integrity 
of the rating process, the independence and the avoidance of conflicts and interest and 
CRAs responsibilities to the public and issuers.60 This paper gives examples to each 
problematic area below. 
Measures, which New Zealand could adopt, are in relation to the quality and integrity of 
the rating process, for example: to conduct a thorough analysis of all infonnation known 
to the CRA that is relevant for the rating, ratings can be subjected to some fo1m of 
objective validation; misleading ratings or other info1mation should be avoided and a 
periodic review system should be established. Monito1ing and updating credit ratings is 
another central issue in the IOSCO Code of Conduct. Moreover, CRAs and its employees 
should behave with integ1ity, preventing the entire rating process from being affected by 
illegal, unfair or dishonest behaviour.61 
Separating its credit rating business from any other business, like providing advisory 
services to issuers, shall significantly improve CRAs' independence and avoidance of 
conflicts of interest. In addition, internal procedures to timely identify and manage 
adequately any conflicts of interest as well as the disclosure of potential conflicts of 
interest are also high on the agenda. 62 Conflicts of interest may emerge where an analyst 
of a CRA has a personal relation with an employee of a rated company or where an 
analyst has a financial interest in the rated company itself. 63 
A timely, transparent and comprehensive disclosme of credit ratings is also required. In 
order to draw a conclusive picture, both the public and issuers necessarily need to 
comprehend the rating process, the underlying elements and procedures. Information 
about the last update of a paiticular rating and whether the issuer has paiticipated in a 
59 
Ibid, at 3 . 
60 Ibid , at 4 , 7 and I 0 . 
6 1 Ibid , at 4-6 . 
62 
Ibid , at 7-8. 
63 Ibid , at 8-10. 
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credit rating process should also be disclosed.64 The IOSCO Code of Conduct contains 
many other provisions, overall it clearly aims at providing the public with a much more 
transparent and broader picture with regard to both credit ratings and CRAs. 
In fact , by 2007, according to a IOSCO Task Force report, the big three CRAs had 
"substantially implemented" the IOSCO Code of Conduct. 65 The industry is apparently 
willing to participate in improving their standards. The author welcomes this 
development. One the other hand, arguably, the IOSCO Code of Conduct still lacks of 
one essential feature: enforcement.66 There has no authority been established by the 
industry that supervises and controls CRAs compliance with the new standards. 
Moreover, the "substantial" implementation of the IOSCO standards means that CRAs 
ce1tainly aligned the IOSCO Code of Conduct with their own idea of standards. This 
paper provides below an answer whether that approach copes sufficiently with the 
emerging problems or not. 
Canada obviously considers self-regulation alone not sufficient. The Canadian Securities 
Administrator (CSA) has recently published for comment the National Instrument 25-101 
Designated Rating Organizations and related consequential amendments .67 This is an 
interesting approach, as at first glance the CSA proposal relies largely on the IOSCO 
Code of Conduct. 
Yet, how does that work exactly? CRAs have to apply to become a "des ignated rating 
organization" (DRO), that is then allowed to provide its ratings for different purposes 
under the securities legislation . As soon as the particular CRA becomes a DRO, it is 
required to establish a code of conduct, which generally complies with the IOSCO Code 
of Conduct. 68 It is apparent that the CSA has decided to tum the IOSCO Code of Conduct 
in this way into a legally binding document. A look at the National Instrnment 25-10 I 
makes clear that the focus is on compliance with this code. Additional requirements are 
laid down in this regulation, concentrating on conflicts of interest. The proposal touches 
slightly on enforcement, by saying that in cases of conflicts of interest the authority can 
64 
65 
66 
67 
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fbid , at 10-1 2. 
IOSCO Task Force Report (February 2007). 
Maris, above n 54 , ibid . 
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( 16 Jul y 20 I 0) News Release <www. bcsc.bc.ca>. 
Ibid . 
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prohibit the issuing or maintaining of ratings. 69 This is believed to be a soft approach in 
dealing with enforcement with CRAs though. 
Having this recent and appealing example in mind, the question arises how New Zealand 
should be dealing with the regulation of CRAs. As the author pointed out that the 
Government has not yet implemented comprehensive and sufficient regulation, the key 
question will then be whether Canada's approach may be worth to consider. 
B The current New Zealand Approach 
As briefly touched on above, unlike the United States, the European Union and Australia, 
New Zealand has not passed new legislation with regard to the regulation of CRAs. 70 In 
fact, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand waits and sees. So far they only set up some 
rough Guidelines, which deal with the approval of CRAs for the non-bank deposit taker 
sector.71 The Guidelines do , in fact, not base on the IOSCO Code of Conduct. The author 
considers them as shallow and inappropriate. In addition, they cover solely the area of 
non-bank deposit takers . 
This hesitant approach is underpinned by the above quotation , that the Reserve Bank 
"plans to watch the global debate", before initiating its own regulation. 72 Logically, then 
the question comes to mind whether the enactment of approp1iate regulation is not 
indicated and overdue. 
Yet, the author can only respond to this issue properly, after having looked at the general 
approach of the cmTent New Zealand Government in relation to regulation . The 
Government has issued a statement on regulation, which paints a clear picture of how the 
current Government approaches regulation. 73 The promise is to " introduce new regulation 
only when we [the Government] are satisfied that it is required , reasonable, and robust" . 
Moreover, existing regulation will be reviewed " in order to identi fy and remo ve 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
Canadian Securities Administrators "Noti ce and Request fo r Comment Proposed Nationa l 
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depos it taker sector" (2008) RBNZ <www. rbnz .govt.n z>. 
See Introduction above, part I, p 2,see also Reserve Bank of New Zealand "Financial Stability 
Report" (May 20 10) RBNZ at 3 <www. rbnz.govt.nz>. 
Hon Bill Engli sh and Rodney Hide "Government Sta tement on Regula tion: Better Regulati on, 
Less Regulation" (press re lease, 17 August 2009) <www.treasury.govt.nz>. 
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requirements that are unnecessary, ineffective or excessively costly". 74 Considering the 
rights at stake in this pai1 III and the international approach of regulating CRAs in pai1 
IV, this paper will point out that new regulation is absolutely required and reasonable . 
1 Changes to the current regulato,y system 
The potential regulation of CRAs will need to be embedded in , and will presumably be 
aligned with, the entire regulation of the financial markets in New Zealand. As a 
comprehensive explanation of the regulation of the financial markets would go beyond 
the scope of this paper, this paper briefly outlines the situation with regard to the main 
regulators of New Zealand financial markets. This outline will help the reader p1imarily 
to grasp the notion behind the Government 's approach , which might also be dominating 
the discussion as to the regulation of CRAs. 
CuITently, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand is the main prudential regulator of the 
financial markets. The Government has announced that, by 2011 , a new "super-regulator" 
will be established: the Financial Markets Authority (FMA). This is pa11icularly in order 
to win back public confidence in the financial system, which has been heavily diminished 
since the beginning of the financial crisis . According to Commerce Minister Hon Simon 
Power: "The Financial Markets Authority (FMA) will consolidate functions cun-ently 
fragmented across the Securities Commission, the Ministry of Economic Development, 
including the Government Actua1y, and NZX [the New Zealand stock exchange]." 75 Yet 
there is going to be a coexistence of the FMA and the Reserve Bank, comparable to the 
Australian "twin peaks" model, consisting of the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission (ASIC) and the Australian Prudential Regulation Autho1ity (APRA). The 
Reserve Bank will keep its powers, unlike the new established FMA, which is expected 
to be a restructured and strengthened Securities Commission. 76 
2 Pwpose of the reform and implications for this paper 
Hence, one of the main intentions of thi s refo1m is "to win back public confidence" or, in 
other words , "to restore confidence of mum and dad investors in our [New Zealand 's] 
74 
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financial market."77 The Government has recognized that investors' money and 
confidence has been damaged by the lack of a comprehensive regulation. The FMA's aim 
would be "visible, proactive and timely enforcement". 78 Apparently, the present risks, 
particularly for investors, are being taken seriously. Yet one might say that if a crisis 
occurs or other serious deficits are identified, generally governments are quickly inclined 
to pass new regulation to resolve the present issues. The author, however, is inclined to 
believe in the intention of the cun-ent Government to restore public confidence in a 
sustainable way and will apply this intention through the remaining parts of the paper. 
This application occurs though by keeping in mind that the broad use of regulatory 
measures is commonly not seen as a panacea. 79 
There seems to be an alignment of interests between the Reserve Bank and the 
Commerce Minister regarding the fm1her development of an efficient regulatory 
environment. Accordingly, it is necessary to keep a careful eye on the cuITent 
development. This is particularly so against the background of both the announced 
establishment of the new "super-regulator", and an internationally dominated approach as 
to the regulation of CRAs, which this paper will examine in detail in part IV. 
C Striving for a New Zealand Solution: the Clash of Regulation and Laissez-faire 
Taking the different goals of regulation and self-regulation adequately into account, the 
author will be st1iving to balance the interests of New Zealand and the significant 
affected market participants, as well as the jeopardised 1ights, appropriately. This chapter 
ends with a preliminary result as to the clash of regulation and self-regulation . 
Eventually, this paper will argue that there are sufficient reasons for regulation. Before 
doing so the I tum to the identified issues: issues in relation to the work of CRAs that are 
relevant for justifying New Zealand 's intervention, possibly impaired consumer right, the 
issue of financial literacy and , finally, the question whether a lack of competition 
characterises the CRA industry. Then , this author outlines the specific case of financial 
regulation and its implications. 
Goals of regulation in relation to CRAs must be to protect consumer rights , to enhance 
competition and to secure New Zealand 's financial market, by not suppressing 
77 
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disproportionately rights of CRAs.80 In the author's view, there is definitely both room 
and need for the regulation of CRAs. 
However, there are two possible approaches to resolve the current issue, namely, an 
intervention by the Government or a laissez-faire approach. The cun-ent New Zealand 
regulatory approach is aiming at, among other things, restoring public confidence in the 
New Zealand financial markets. This aim, alongside the requirement to step in, which this 
paper will identify, should persuade the Government to regulate CRAs. 
In order to prove the assumption that the Government will be required to step in, this 
paper deals, from a public law perspective, in-depth with the most interesting question as 
to the clash ofregulation and self-regulation. 
The IOSCO Code of Conduct and its implementation by the big three CRAs underlines a 
self-regulatory approach. This paper will argue though, that CRAs and the other involved 
parties cannot self-regulate all so1ts of emerging problems. New Zealand's consumers 
need protection by the Government, as important consumer rights are impaired. 
Moreover, inc01Tect credit ratings are likely to vigorously affect the domestic financial 
market. That is exactly the moment when regulation is required, as governments then 
usually are able to generate solutions, in this case considering and protecting rights of 
CRAs, issuers, investors and the public. In the event of a decision for new regulation, 
government regulation must reflect which of those parties require more protection than 
the other and "whose interests are to count" and in what manner.81 
Deciding about a need for regulation of CRAs demands a proper understanding of their 
industry and business. Accordingly, the following pait provides a clear picture of the 
main issues. It builds upon the overview of the IOSCO Code of Conduct to identify these 
issues. 
1 Identified issues 
This paper identifies three groups of issues which are tied to the question for regulation 
and are relevant for New Zealand. The first group consists of the specific issues which 
are related to the work of CRAs. Consumer rights, financial literacy, competition and 
rights of CRAs belong to the second group. Economic issues, in paiticular the most 
recent financial crisis, form the third group. 
80 
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(a) Specific issues related to the work of CRAs 
The author turns first to the inherent issues of the credit rating process and the 
business of CRAs. These are the san1e as dealt with in the IOSCO Code of Conduct. 
As shown above, there are three problematic areas: the quality and integrity of the 
rating process, the independence and the avoidance of conflicts and interest and CRAs 
responsibilities to the public and issuers .82 The potential as well as the need for 
improving standards, methodologies, internal compliance systems and timely 
disclosure of information is not deniable. The IOSCO Code of Conduct and its 
implementation by the big three make this clear. 
Further issues have emerged though. In particular the payment methods of the CRA 
industry has come under fire. The most common payment method is, that issuers pay 
the CRA (the so called "issuer pays business model"). The example and the 
description of the Subprime Crisis, given above, both base on that model. The author 
agrees with several independent studies, that another model, the so called "subsc1iber 
pays business model" could be used instead of the "issuer pays business model"83 
Under the "subsc1iber pays business model" investors pay the rater, it therefore 
prevents conflicts arising out of financial relations between issuers and CRAs. 
However, this paper argues that in the end appropriate transparency counts the most. 
Even the common "issuer pays business model" makes sense, if payment streams are 
transparent. 
The special knowledge of CRAs and their unique position in the financial world 1s 
considered crucial as well. Governments and regulators worldwide rely on credit 
ratings, New Zealand alike. The business bases mostly on an adequate infonnation 
flow and a deep insight into industries as well as financial products. Other companies , 
industiies and even governments do not have the same amount of information 
available, at least to bundled in the same way. Therefore the process how CRAs come 
to specific credit ratings is so difficult to comprehend . 
(b) Fu1ther issues 
In addition to the specific issues, there exist other issues , namely consumer rights , 
financial literacy, competition and rights of CRAs. Some of them might have been the 
underlying reasons for introducing the IOSCO Code of Conduct, the Canadian 
See above III A. 
See Wo lverson, above n 31 , ibid with further references. 
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approach and other already implemented regulation. Due to their significance for a 
New Zealand solution, this paper stresses these fundamental rights at stake. 
(i) Consumer Rights impaired? 
Indeed consumer 1ights are impaired by incorrect credit ratings. Thus, paiticular 
attention must be paid to them. In particular, unsophisticated investors are unlikely to 
comprehend often complex investment products. A credit rating is therefore generally 
supposed to foster both understanding and 1isk assessment of consumers, by providing 
easily understandable ratings. Consumers have, on the one hand, usually not the time, 
resources or intellectual skills to grasp the structure of a paiticular tricky investment 
product. On the other hand, their interest in a decent investment return often dominates 
investment decisions. 
Additionally, the significance of the invested assets for an average consumer must be 
highlighted. Regulai·Jy investments of consumers aim at the financial security of entire 
families and retirement pensions. Due to a misleading credit rating the financial 
protection and social security of a family could be heavily impaired. Property rights of 
consumers are also likely to be at stake 
Wood draws the picture of an, in a financial sense, illiterate and "often stupid" 
consumer.84 Without the intention to follow Wood that far down the path, this paper 
says that the ordinary consumer as investor belongs to a group of people who, by 
virtue of a lack of knowledge and the rights at stake, deserves special protection by the 
Government. 
(ii) Financial literacy of consumers 
In relation to credit ratings, financial literacy of New Zealanders does matter a lot. 
Apparently though, financial literacy of consumers has been a long tin1e not seen as a 
real issue by governments, inter alia, the New Zealand Government.85 This might have 
been a fatal defect, for at least two reasons: financial decisions of non-expe1t 
consumers ai·e able to affect both their own wealth and, put in the broader context, 
Wood, above n 8, at [2-022] and [2-024]. 
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Madria11 and others "The Regulation of Consumer Financial Products: An introductory Essay with 
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even the stability of entire economies.86 
Interestingly, credit ratings are meant to balance out insufficient financial literacy, in 
other words a lack of financial knowledge. By simplifying complex financial facts and 
casting them in the mould of specific credit ratings, at least theoretically, CRAs 
provide consumers with a tool to easily grasp the risk of particular investments.87 This 
requires though, that credit ratings are correct and not misleading. As a consequence 
this paper recommends the New Zealand Government to considering the issue of 
financial literacy thoroughly when deciding about the regulation of CRAs. 
Financial literacy can be broadly defined as "the ability to make info1med judgements 
and decisions regarding the use and management of money".88 Effectively, consumers 
with a higher level of financial literacy are able to think through their investments or 
monetary decisions thoroughly as well as conducting reasonable risk assessments. The 
level of financial literacy influences in tum decisions of banks and other providers of 
financial products. The better consumers understand these products and , accordingly, 
invest their money and take credits carefully, the more banks have to offer appropriate 
products to meet their clients' needs. This, arguably, can mean a huge difference for 
New Zealand's economy. That difference becomes clearer when considering the fact 
that the household sector holds financial assets and liabilities of an enormous size. 89 
Whether that money is kept under the pillow, invested in real estate property or given 
to companies as part of a bond investment, directly influences the domestic 
economy.90 The more consumers handle their financial affairs in the same way, the 
stronger is the effect on the economy. 
However, research has found out that "many New Zealanders have limited financial 
literacy". 91 The Government's aim should therefore be to increasing financial literacy 
among New Zealand consumers. Credit ratings are likely to contribute to reach that 
aim, if they are con-ect and reliable. On the other hand, a situation, where consumers 
Ibid , Widdowson and Hai I wood, at 3 7; Campbell, Jackson, Madrian and others, at 3. 
Compare paragraph above, III C 1 (b) (i). 
Widdowson and Hailwood, above n 85, at 37, with reference to Somnath Basu ''Financial 
literacy and the life cycle" (2005) Washington, DC: Financial Planning Association. 
Ibid , at 38-39; Campbell , Jackson , Mad1ian and others, above n 86, at 5 . 
See example, given above under IJ B 3 . 
Widdowson and Hailwood, above n 85, at 42-44 , with reference to the surveys conducted by the 
ANZ in 2006 and the Reserve Bank in 2007. 
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rely blindly on credit ratings is also far from desirable. This view is underpinned by 
the statement that credit ratings are not determined as recommendation to buy or sell 
investment products.92 Despite that common statement, or rather disclaimer, and 
somehow comprehensibly, as a matter of fact , consumers orientate themselves by the 
means of credit ratings.93 
In the meantime the issue of financial literacy has been identified by governments 
worldwide.94 Work is under way to strengthen financial literacy, among other things, 
by improving disclosure standards and changing regulation of financial advisors. 95 
Given that, does limited financial literacy really vindicate a regulation of CRAs? This 
paper argues so, even if it is not financial literacy itself which lastly justifies 
regulatory measures, it reasonably completes the reasons yet given, not to forget its 
considerable influence on the economy and the potential outcome for conswners. 
Clearly understandable and reliable financial information like a credit rating will 
enable even unsophisticated consumers to come to a sound financial decision, when 
facing an "ever-increasing diversity of financial products and services" .96 
Though the recent past has shown that the tool credit rating has occasionally been 
either incorrect/not up-to-date or was deliberately used as teaser for patticular products 
by financial ad visors without providing comprehensive information. In order to protect 
consumers to the utmost extent, regulation suggests itself Poor financial choices are 
likely to decrease financial wealth and increase debt levels. 97 To underline that 
argument with a figure: "Over the decade to December 2006, household debt [in New 
Zealand] has increased almost three times". 98 
Undoubtedly, financial illiteracy is an issue m New Zealand, and coupled with 
inappropriate credit ratings inevitably (financially) worsening New Zealand consumers 
Motadel, above n 29, ibid: compare Widdowson and Wood, above n 26, at 58. 
"Some Credit Sails clients given access to buyback" By TIM HUNTER - BusinessDay.co.nz 
Last updated 05:00 15/07/2010 (THE DOMINION POST): "Investors now facing losses of close 
to I 00 per cent were told Credit Sails notes were capital-protected and carried a AA rating from 
Standard & Poor's.". 
Widdowson and Hailwood, above n 85, at 41-42, 44-46; Campbell, Jackson, Madrian and others, 
above n 85, at 11-19 . 
Widdowson and Hailwood, ibid, at 46; Campbell, Jackson, Madrian and others, ibid , at 15-19. 
Widdowson and Hailwood, ibid, at 38 . 
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Ibid . 
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and households. The 2006 ANZ-Retirement Commission Financial Knowledge Survey 
and a 2007 poll commissioned by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand indicated,99 that 
New Zealanders "do not effectively understand the basic financial terms or 
instruments or, more worryingly, the concept of risk and retum". 100 
There can be no doubt, that more financial education is needed to sustainably enhance 
financial literacy. 10 1 Regulation on the other hand cannot lead to more sophisticated 
financial decisions , but it can improve the protection of non-expert consumers. 
According to the cited surveys consumers are well-aware of credit ratings. 102 
Apparently, credit ratings are accepted by consumers and play an important role in 
financial decision making. Consequently, the cry for a regulation of CRAs must 
become even louder. Info1mation asymmetries between financial experts and non-
expe11 consumers need to be reduced , financial decisions have to be based on simple 
and reliable infonnation. 103 A clear lack of consumer financial knowledge in 
conjunction with the potential negative outcome for consumers and the economy are 
good reasons for a regulatory intervention. 
(iii) Competition and other rights at stake 
The importance of a regulation of CRAs is underpinned by looking at the fm1her 
issues at stake: competition and the quasi-regulat01y function of CRAs. 
Due to the dominant market position of the big three CRAs, it is commonly refeITed to 
them as oligopoly, a condition where " [a] market [is] dominated by a small number of 
participants who are able to collectively exert control over supply and market 
prices" . i0-1 Smaller CRAs are present, but rare and not significant for the credit rating 
market. 
In fact , there is a significant lack of competition. Yet competition is a basic 
requirement for self-regulation, facilitating self-coITecting of market failures and 
contributing to a fair market environment. 105 The ongoing global discussion is 
reflecting this issue. The European approach, as the author will show in part IV, 
Hereinafter refen-ed to as "surveys". 
Widdowson and Hail wood, above n 85 , at 44-45. 
Ibid , at 44 . 
Ibid , at 43. 
Campbe ll , Jackson, Madrian and others, above n 85 , at 5. 
Definiti on Oligopo ly <www. in vestorwo rds.com>. 
Ibid; Blaurock, above n 20, at 6, 29 and 30. 
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suggests to establish a European CRA which could compete with the big three. 106 It is 
questionable whether this would finally lead to more competition. This paper argues 
that improving the requirements for smaller CRAs to enter into the markets and to 
compete with the big CRAs is a more promising measure. 
The quasi-regulatory function of CRAs regarding banks and other financial and 
insurance companies supports the cry for regulation. These companies are obliged by 
law to obtain a rating from an approved rating agency. 107 As a result, companies, 
governments and investors rely on these ratings. 
As a consequence of can-ying out this important supervisory function in light of the 
whole financial system, CRAs must comply with enhanced regulatory standards. 
(iv) Rights of CRAs impaired? 
When looking at possibly infringed tights of consumers and the other yet discussed 
issues, one is inclined to forget possibly impaired rights of CRAs. Undoubtedly, there 
are also rights at stake. CRAs collect data, gather different sorts of info1mation and are 
in an ongoing exchange with market pa11icipants, for example issuers of investment 
products, in order to form an opinion about a specific investment product. This 
opinion is then transformed into a credit rating and usually published. As a 
consequence potential regulation, which would restrict CRAs in their doing, 1s 
possibly able to infringe at least the freedom of opinion, infonnation or press, as 
governed by section 14 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. 108 
Generally speaking, everyone could be collecting information about an investment 
product, conducting a rating process and publishing own credit ratings. That explains 
why credit ratings regularly fall outside existing, non-CRAs specific, financial 
regulation. It is apparent that CRAs would, based on this potential infringement, use 
this point definitely as an argument for self-regulation. This, certainly, at first glance 
seems to be a reasonable argument. At second glance, this argument loses weight, 
when looking closely at regulatory measures, already unde11aken in other markets like 
the United States and the European Union, that New Zealand might decide to follow. 
See below under N C l , and Edmund Parker and Miles Bake "Regulation of credit rating agencies 
in Europe" (2009) 7 JIBFL 401, at 402. 
See Reserve Bank of New Zealand Amendment Act 2008, ss 157!-K and Insurance Companies 
(Ratings and In pection ) Act 1994, 5. 
Compare Blaurock, above n 20, at 23. 
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Regulation in the United States and the European Union applies solely to ratings , 
which are used for regulatory purposes. Accordingly, if CRAs want to provide ratings 
for these purposes, they have to apply first for registration and meet the required 
standards.109 As a result CRAs do not longer publish a mere opinion, they deliver a 
credit rating for a particular purpose, required by governments. This is a simple trick 
to get around the high hurdle of the freedom of opinion, by simultaneously taking this 
fundamental right adequately into account. If New Zealand follows the regulatory 
approach of the United States and the European Union, the freedom of opinion will 
not be infringed. 
The positive outcome for the financial sector is, that essential assessments for systemic 
impo11ant banks have now to be provided by registered CRAs, complying with 
enhanced standards. 11 0 The big three CRAs are likely to comply with these 
requirements, in pai1icular to be able to deliver their services in the specific market. 
However, this approach evidently creates a huge gap. Other than the big CRAs might 
decide to focus on credit ratings which are not used for regulatory purposes. 111 
Another concern is, given other regulatory regimes and the fact , that current regulation 
"goes beyond the IOSCO Code of Conduct", smaller CRAs in third-countries may 
have issues to act in accordance with these rules. 11 1 As a result this approach is likely 
to be decreasing competition in the markets in the United States and the European 
Union. The market for smaller CRAs might diminish significantly in size. In order to 
avoid similar consequences in New Zealand , rights of smaller CRAs must be 
appropriately considered . 
The big three CRAs have "substantially" implemented the IOSCO Code of Conduct, 
which requires comprehensive transparency, rest1ictions in conducting business and 
broad disclosure of infonnation. At least theoretically, CRAs could raise the criticism 
that governments who impose similai· responsibilities on them, disproportionally 
infringe their businesses. On the other hand , provisions such as : "the credit analyst 
must be competent", or "the credit analyst must not be in a close relationship with an 
employee of the issuer", are in accordance with best practice. 
As la id down in the EC Regula tion and US Regulation, above n 49 . 
Ibid . 
Compare Parker and Bake, above n I 06 , ibid . 
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Another argument for self-regulation, which can be raised by CRAs, is liability. 
Possibly, CRAs face liability for incoITect ratings. Why is then comprehensive 
regulation required? The Subprime Crisis illustrated what the impact of a large number 
of incorrect credit ratings can be. This paper hence argues that private liability is not 
sufficient to deal adequately with the cu1Tent issues. Moreover, if credit ratings are 
opinions, that anyone could issue, it is unlikely that investors could successfully sue 
CRAs. 113 
( c) Economic issues and the most recent financial crisis 
Economic issues are the third group of identified issues. Again, the author highlights 
three areas: the role of CRAs in the current financial world , the most recent financial 
crisis and public confidence in CRAs and financial markets generally. 
Due to the regulatory function, governments commissioned CRAs with, the role of 
CRAs in the cuITent financial world is often refeITed to as gatekeeper function. CRAs 
rate banks and insurance companies all over the world, assessing their risks and 
whether they meet the Basel III or Solvency I, which as an equivalent to Basel III 
applies to insurance companies in the European Union , capital requirements. 114 As a 
consequence, these credit ratings affect globally govemments, companies, consumers 
and many others, that use for example banking services. This service has become so 
impoltant in our modem world. 
Therefore this unique position of CRAs often leads to criticism, which this paper 
shares. 11 5 As a result of being highly familiar with their customers, in palticular with 
their products, and gathering the relevant so11s of information, CRAs possess valuable 
special knowledge, which is pooled together by the CRAs and exclusively used for 
their purposes. 
Both the recent past and the global big picture show that the consequences of incorrect 
credit ratings and an unregulated CRA industly , in pai1icular the most recent financial 
crisis, must give cause to reconsider the cuITent (self-)regulation of CRAs. Further 
crises are likely to occur. As other governments have passed regulation in relation to 
CRAs, New Zealand is well advised to take into consideration whether and how to 
join them. Calls for enhanced regulation of CRAs have, and justifiably so, not fallen 
Ibid . 
Basel III / Solvency I. 
Bowen, above n 31 , ibid; The Financial Regulation Forum, above n 32, ibid ; compare also the 
IOSCO Code of Conduct, above n 58 , at I . 
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silent smce 2008. 11 6 Bunjevac stated, referring to Australia, that "the measures 
proposed by the US and EU are both justified and necessary, and recommends the 
adoption of a number of these proposals and legal concepts into Australian law" .117 
Accordingly, in the meantime Australia has introduced new regulation. 11 8 
The impo11ance of this approach becomes crystal clear, by recalling the above drawn 
picture of the emergence of the Subprime Crisis in the United States. 11 9 Initially, the 
above called bonds, or, more specifically, structured investment products (Asset 
Backed Securities (ABS), Residential Mortgage Backed Securities (RMBS) and 
Collateralized Debt Obligations (CD0))1 20 themselves were quickly blamed as the 
culprits of the Subprime Crisis and the following financial crisis. As a consequence 
investors, governments and regulatory bodies blamed primarily the issuers of these 
products for the crisis. First, the contribution of CRAs to the c1isis was completely 
ignored. Yet the contribution of CRAs, namely incon-ect ratings, paired with a lack of 
investor trust inevitably has caused a considerable lack of liquidity in the markets. 
Among others, the loss of this money led to financial instability and eventually left 
consumers and likewise (private) companies or governments sailing close to the wind, 
or in other words, on the b1ink of insolvency. As further crises of a similar extent need 
to be prevented, governments must focus on a regulation of CRAs. 
User of credit ratings, consumer and companies, have lost confidence in CRAs and 
financial markets generally since the recent financial ciisis. 121 Simultaneously, 
reputation, which was once considered the biggest asset of CRAs seems to be gone. 
Considering the losses, many investors have suffered, that is quite understandable. The 
look of investors and the public at financial markets has also changed. The author 
believes that they have become more aware of the real nature of financial markets. I 
look upon this fact favourably, as financial markets "tend to be especially prone to 
frequent crisis and flux" and "are notoriously vulnerable to self-fulfilling speculative 
'bubbles' and attacks". 112 This is something the public must be aware of. However the 
author considers the most recent random market reactions, market losses, illiquidity 
Hazen, above n 34, ibid. 
Bunjevac, above n 4 , at 42. 
See below under ND . 
Sy, above n 2, at 15-17. 
Asset-Backed Secu1ities, Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities, Collateralized debt obligations. 
Bunjevac, above n 4 , at 44; Campbell, Jackson , Madrian and other , above n 86, at 3. 
Grote and Marauhn , above n 13, at 43. 
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and insolvencies, especially of systemic impo1tant banks as a result of a lack of 
regulation, inter al ia of CRAs, and market instability. 123 
2 The general case of regulation 
I have already pointed out that New Zealand might be required to step in to regulate 
CRAs. The market standard credit rating process has evidently led to many problems in 
financial markets and features many issues itself. In the author's view, agreeing with 
many financial experts, CRAs have contributed significantly to the financial crisis. 124 A 
b1ief summary will help to understand the following analysis ofregulation. 
Is CRA's contribution to the Subp1ime Crisis sufficient, however, to require government 
action? Even though the latest financial crisis has hit New Zealand and CRAs are 
conducting business here, and are thus likely to influence the New Zealand financial 
system, investors and consumer 1ights, the public perception might be that there are more 
urgent tasks for the Government to cope with first. Understandably, the public perceives 
the Government ' s duty to step in to regulate mainly in areas where essential and basis 
public services are at stake. 125 
Given this picture of regulation, this paper will , firstly, fmther examine briefly the goals 
of regulation and self-regulation, in paiticular, in relation to CRAs, before setting the 
issues and rights at stake, identified above, in relation to each other and answe1ing 
whether the regulation of CRAs is, in fact , required . 
The abovementioned common subjects of regulation give a hint what reasons for new 
regulation often are, inter alia the following :126 providing welfare and social secmity, 
enhancing competition, adequate protection against internal and external threats , 
efficiency, legitimacy criteria, accountability and transparency. These reasons reflect 
fundamental rights and p1inciples like property and competition, which were identified 
above as being negatively affected by the current work of CRAs and the existing 
oligopoly. 
Yet, it is evident that di sad vantages are al so tied to regulation , like over-reliance on 
121 
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See for typica l subjects of regulation above II A I . 
Compare Schneiberg and Banley, above n 8, a t 33 . 
36 The Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies in New Zealand from a Public Law Perspective 
regulation, costs, ineffectiveness and red tape. In addition, governments are prone to 
over-regulate, especially nowadays risk aversion is the impulse of regulation. 127 
Accordingly, governments face a cmcial task when being confronted with a cry for more 
or enhanced regulation. This requires an exact consideration of both the advantages and 
disadvantages ofregulation, precisely compared with the means of self-regulation. 
The New Zealand Government emphasises the importance of an outstanding 
regulation. 128 Ultimately, the Government aims at establishing an improved place for 
conducting business while simultaneously going global and offering an internationally 
competitive spot. 129 This is intended to enhance New Zealand's position in the world and 
compensate for the country's small size and specific geographical isolation. 130 Yet, by 
what means can this be reached? Apparently, both better and less regulation is preferable, 
as "outdated, poorly conceived and poorly implemented regulation can significantly 
hinder individual freedom, innovation and productivity". 131 The current Government 
perceives the danger of over-regulation as an issue. It is said in the Government 
Statement on Regulation that, therefore, balancing thoroughly the pros and cons of 
regulation in a specific area on a case-by-case basis seems desirable. 
The New Zealand Government appears aware of the fact that regulation is a double-edged 
sword, featuring both pros and cons. After having identified the main pros for regulation , 
the following section will deal with the specific case of financial regulation and provide 
the main reasons for self-regulation, which, roughly speaking, in the case of dealing with 
CRAs can be turned into the cons of regulation. 
3 The specific case of financial regulation - reasons for laissez-faire? 
As the focus of this paper is on financial regulation, it makes sense to outline the aims of 
financial regulation. It aims generally at stability of the financial system. Governments 
therefore should regulate with the objectives of reducing costs and, in particular, risks, 
providing stability and predictability and taking property rights appropriately into 
account. 132 
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The underlying notion of (financial) regulation sees free markets limited in their 
capability to cope with the emerging problems. Self-regulation is often able to cope more 
appropriately and successfully with problems than regulation. Industries can govern their 
own affairs and businesses, laying down own rules and standards, thus increasing 
growth. 133 Companies of a particular market are familiar and closely connected with the 
industry. Therefore advocates of self-regulation claim this special institutional 
knowledge, alongside a high self-interest to manage issues properly, flexibility, and cost-
effectiveness as key benefits for the specific market as well as for the entire economy. 134 
Well-functioning self-regulation requires sound competition and an almost ideal market 
environment though. Wherever there is a significant lack of competition, like in a 
monopoly and , possibly, also in an oligopoly like the existing one in relation to CRAs, 
these requirements are not met. Moreover, what happens in cases of market failures? 
Markets might be able to correct some market failures, but certainly not all. If 
government intervention becomes eventually necessary, then to what extent requires this 
regulation? 
Considering the needs of and providing protection for quite distinct market participants at 
different stages is a challenging task, for the industry as well as for governments. Failures 
in this consideration process might result in reducing consumer rights , diminishing 
competition or a lack of public confidence in financial products, in other words, a higher 
risk to financial systems. 135 Financial regulation aims specifically at avoiding these risks, 
which can develop into systemic 1isks. Systemic 1isks can be domino effects, in 
paiticular, if there occurs a bank bankruptcy, which causes fu1ther bankrnptcies and 
eventually heavily affects an entire financial system. In such an event, it is very likely 
that investors (among others consumers) will have to wiite off their invested money in 
total. 136 
Further impo1tant objectives of financial regulation are the protection of the public and 
unsophisticated investors, education of the public and infotmation transparency. 
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Moreover, it must be complied with principles as to providing a level playing field and 
market confidence, prevention of crime, having efficient enforcement methods and 
maintaining competition. 137 
4 Implications: sufficient reasons for regulation? 
The issues of the credit rating process were identified and addressed in the example and 
the description of the Subp1ime Crisis as well as by the IOSCO Code of Conduct, namely 
conflicts of interest, special knowledge of CRAs and their unique position, and a lack of 
transparency. 138 Given these issues, the rights at stake and the notions of (financial) 
regulation and self-regulation, this paper argues for a regulatory intervention by the New 
Zealand Government. There are sufficient reasons for regulation. 
The perception of New Zealand is that it is a remote count1y and from an economic 
perspective not a big player, compared to other countries in the world. Nevertheless, 
CRAs, as one of the main culprits of the most recent financial c1isis, conduct business 
here and the financial markets as well as consumers have been hit by the financial crisis 
either. 
However, while bearing the reasons for regulation and self-regulation in mind , the 
Government must first precisely consider whether they are able to resolve the present 
issue without taking regulato1y measures. This accords with the Government Statement 
on Regulation , the Government "does not see regulation as the first reso11 for problem 
solving". 139 The cuITent Government sees an obligation to fulfil its responsibilities only 
where new regulation is "required, reasonable, and robust". 140 As a consequence the 
hurdle to enact new legislation appears considerably high. It is ce1tainly comprehensible, 
that governments cannot and must not enact regulation which aims at coveting 
comprehensively the conduct of entire societies and businesses, just in order to secure 
any rights which might be impaired. The inherent defect of such governmental aim seems 
to be obvious. It increasingly leads to a dangerous condition of over-prescription, over-
protectionism, unrealistic expectations of the public and impracticality. 141 Pe1manent 
reliance on government protection in all regards of daily life is rather in contrast to the 
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purpose of regulation than meeting the intended objective of securing the public against 
dangers like pove1ty, hunger or homelessness, and providing the access to basic resources 
like power/electricity and telecommunication. 
Possibly, therefore a laissez-faire approach copes more appropriately with the present 
issue. The CRA industry countered upcoming criticism in 2003/2004 by approving the 
IOSCO Code of Conduct. 
Advocates of this liberal opinion would, staiting from the IOSCO Code of Conduct as 
well as ideas of individual responsibility and efficient markets, consider regulation of 
CRAs generally not required. According to the liberal opinion, both the financial markets 
and other CRAs would discipline CRAs in the event of incoJTect ratings, a lack of 
disclosure with regard to the rating process or other essential infornrntion, and other sorts 
of professional misconduct. This liberal approach is suppo11ed by the fact, that, evidently, 
the regulation of CRAs is on the edge of the public-p1ivate-law divide. In general, private 
companies conduct business. In cases of losses or misconduct, private liability might 
solve the emerging problems. One could therefore ask for obligations of CRAs to pay 
investors money back, for investor compensation schemes, for explicit 1ights to sue 
CRAs, for liability and what other kind of protection makes sense. Yet, this paper has 
shown, that private liability is unlikely to resolve the present issues. Instead it leads to 
insufficient consumer protection. 
According to the liberal opinion, ultimately, only a hazai·d of se1ious and continuing 
rating failures , leading to losses of consumers and financial markets, could justify 
appropriate regulation. 142 This hazai·d exists, as the author has identified. Therefore, even 
advocates of a liberal approach need to accept the tremendous relevance of the regulation 
of CRAs. The IOSCO Code of Conduct was a beginning, but by far not the cure for the 
inherent diseases of CRAs. The most recent crisis underlined that view. Code of conducts 
and self-regulation by the mai·kets did not prevent this c1isis. In addition, in the author's 
view mandatory transpai·ency standards, disclosure requirements, internal procedures for 
minimizing risks and conflicts of interests were not implemented. 
Therefore the author does not agree with advocates of the liberal self-regulatory 
approach. The financial crisis has clearly illustrated that CRAs are capable to jeopai·dize 
consumer 1ights like property, social security of entire families a11d to cause eno1mous 
haim to national and global financial systems. 14 1 Moreover, the Government has to have 
issues like a sustainable and sound economy, fostering investment opportunities, 
142 
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providing an appealing market environment and protecting market competition high on 
the agenda. 144 Future systemic risks have also to be avoided. 
As the author considers financial literacy of consumers pai1icularly cmcial, this paper 
takes up this issue again. There is a clear lack of financial literacy among New 
Zealanders. In pai1icular consumers often have no other means at hand than credit ratings 
to cai1y out a proper 1isk assessment. 145 They are often not awai·e of the limited 
infonnation value and that "the business of credit analysis is inherently subjective and 
therefore imprecise". 146 People are hence prone to believe in financial ad visors, like the 
banker in the example, and to rely on credit rating, without questioning the info1mation 
received. Interestingly, exactly that notion of over-reliance is usually raised as criticism 
against regulation. I ain not going to allege that CRAs have dishonest motives, but by 
providing credit ratings in the common simple form they virtually take advantage of both 
over-reliance and illiterate consumers. Enhanced disclosure standai·ds and information 
how a certain credit rating was reached are therefore necessarily required. 
This paper raises the clear lack of competition in the CRA indust:Iy as a further argument 
for regulation. If smaller CRAs succeed in having a foot in the door of the big market, a 
free market comes closer, probably also vindicating a reduction of regulation. 
Another impo11ant issue is the cmTent payment method in the CRA industty. Due to the 
"issuer pays business model", financial interests on both sides are blended. A significant 
number of CRAs hence depends on issuers and their healthy fees. Somehow 
understandably, issuers are not really keen to pay for a service, which then results in a 
BBB rating of their investment product. That might have been the reason why CRAs 
have, for a long time, offered adviso1y services for issuers how to achieve higher ratings. 
The "subscriber pays business model" is an option to avoid most of the issues, the author 
would prefer an appropriate level of tt·anspai·ency though. 
However, the ideal picture of CRAs looks different: CRAs ai·e supposed to be 
independent referees, providing independent and objective results. 147 Yet, CRAs have 
144 
145 
146 
14 7 
See and compare ibid . 
Widdowson and Hailwood, above n 85 , at 43 -44. 
Ibid . 
Ibid; see also Sy, above n 2, at 6. 
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abandoned this role, and instead have moved to the 1isk centre of financial markets. 148 
Not deniable striking conflicts of interest are tied to the work of CRAs. Indeed, CRAs 
have a strong economic interest in establishing tight and sustainable business 
relationships with issuers of inveshnent products and other relevant market pa11icipants. 
That seems only fair and reasonable, as these relationships are the core of the business of 
CRAs. 
As a result this paper follows the h·aditional regulatory capitalist, who is inclined to see 
increased risks and a misuse by unregulated CRAs. However, as the following examples 
of international regulation on CRAs will show, a black and white approach is certainly 
not helpful to resolve the present issues. Instead of interfering too vigorously into the 
business of CRAs, the basic risks of this business should be mitigated. 149 Undoubtedly, 
determining 1ights and responsibilities in the light of their economic significance is one of 
the most important tasks of governments. 150 Ideally, before the New Zealand Government 
passes new regulation, an eager consultation of, investors, consumers and CRAs should 
be taking place. Eventually, regulation has to take the rights of CRAs appropriately into 
account. 
D Conclusion 
The author argues that an approp1iate regulatory intervention by the ew Zealand 
Government will be the best way to accommodate the public interest and the individual 
autonomy and responsibility of CRAs. In paiticular consumer and investor rights, 
competition and the financial stability ai·e at stake. 
However, the issue of financial literacy illustrates that regulation of CRAs must be 
suppo11ed by fu11her measures to prevent further c1ises and a misuse of financial 
products. Even though being a helpful tool for investors, the perception of credit ratings 
must change. Investors must leai11 not to blindly over-rely on one source of 
infonnation. 15 1 Financial ad visors must be forced to explain the limited meaning of credit 
ratings in an understandable way to consumers. Then credit ratings can be what they 
148 
149 
150 
15 1 
See Elkhoury, above n 46, at 11; Sy, above n 2, at 1 and 4; see also the explanation to the 
Subprime Crisis above under II B 3. 
Wood, above n 8, at [20-24]. 
Compare Samuels, above n 81, at 24. 
Regulation 1060/2009 on credit rating agencies [2009] OJ L 302/1. 
42 The Regulation of'Credit Rating Agencies in New Zea land from a Public Law Perspective 
01iginally were meant to be: simple tools, assisting to decide whether to make an 
investment or not. 152 
IV Consideration of International Obligations and Requirements 
New Zealand's focus needs to be first on national interests and requirements, even with 
regard to the overseas based CRAs and international investment products. Yet, of big 
importance is the question whether alongside national requirements, cross-border 
transactions and the globally undertaken measures to cope with the issues related to 
CRAs indeed affect New Zealand's approach. 153 This paper argues that New Zealand 
should embrace an internationally labeled approach, before turning to the recent 
regulation in the United States, the European Union and Australia 
A Being part of the global community 
Resulting from the globalisation of the financial markets the current situation in New 
Zealand has to be set in relation to the yet passed regulation in other count1ies. 
Nowadays, especially within the current global c1isis, a country cannot set itself apai1 
from the rest of the world. This has been made c1ystal clear by Hon English and Hide in 
the Government Statement on Regulation . 154 Being pat1 of the global community and 
being able to affect other countries and financial systems by regulating the domestic 
investment environment as well as being likely to be affected by them imposes 
international obligations and requirements on New Zealand. 
Theoretically, New Zealand has the choice to be different and to rely on self-regulation 
and regulatory measures taken elsewhere in the world. Given its responsibility against its 
citizens and economy, the closeness to Australia and the United Kingdom, this paper sees 
this as a fi..111her argument for regulation. Even CRAs demand global consistency, 155 
presumably, primarily in order to reduce their own compliance costs, resulting from 
different regulatory regimes, and to enhance legal certainty for themselves. However, 
152 
153 
154 
155 
See III C I (b) (ii) above in relation to financial I iteracy. 
Compare Hals Scott International Finance: Lall' and Regulation (2nd ed, Sweet&Maxwell 
Ltd, London, 2008) at [ 1-007). 
See Engli sh and Hide, above n 73, ibid . 
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New Zealand could participate in experiences, other governments have made, and build 
on existing regulation, like the Canadian. One might argue, that regulation is not required 
where bigger markets like the Unites States have already imposed enhanced requirements 
on CRAs. The big three CRAs have therefore adopted new standards, at least 
"substantially" the IOSCO Code of Conduct. Yet, omitting to regulate is here not 
considered appropriate, as these standards are still not legally binding and enforceable in 
New Zealand. Own regulation helps around both this hurdle and the fact that the big three 
CRAs are Non-New Zealand companies. By enacting own regulation like the United 
States or the European Union, which requires overseas CRAs to register in order to 
provide their services, these rules become applicable even to these CRAs. 
Accordingly, the regulation of CRAs in other countries is of interest. The author looks at 
the regulation in the United States, in the European Union, by briefly describing the 
implementation in the United J(jngdom, and Australia due to its adjacency to New 
Zealand. Both Australia and the European Union have introduced new regulation, which 
came into effect on the 1 January 2010. 156 Indeed, the European Union as well as the 
United States are cun-ently discussing amendments to their regulation. 157 
B The Influence of the United States 
The United States pioneered the regulation of CRAs. They passed appropriate legislation 
relatively early with the Credit Rating Agency Refom1 Act 2006. This Act combines a 
"comprehensive registration mechanism, ongoing oversight, and empowers the SEC to 
censure, limit, suspend or revoke registration of the NRSRO [ ationally Recognized 
Statistical Rating Organization]". 158 It is striking, though, that this piece of legislation was 
not adequate to prevent the collapse of the housing market in the United States, the origin 
of the Subprime Crisis. 
Accordingly, the United States Government reviewed its regulation and passed in May 
2010 the Senate's financial refonn bill. 159 This Bill focuses on enhancing the oversight 
156 
157 
158 
159 
Regulation I 060/2009 on credit rating agencies [2009] OJ L 302; Corrigendum to Regulation 
1060/2009 on credit rating agencies [2009] OJ L 350/59; Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission "AS IC outlines improvements to regulation of credit rating agencies in Australia" (12 
November 2009) Press release <www.asic.gov.au/asic/>. 
Ibid; with regard to the United States see be low NB. 
Mari , above n 54, at 11 ; Deniz Coskun "Cred it rating agencie in a po t- nron world: Congress 
revisits the NRSRO concept" (2008) 9( 4) JBR 264-283. 
Resto ring American Financial Stability Act of 2010 (US). 
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over CRAs. A new office within the SEC would deal with CRAs. Its powers would 
comprise the authority to fine CRAs in cases of misconduct and to examine CRAs "at 
least once a year". In addition, CRAs would be required to disclose more information and 
to improve internal control standards. Moreover, private investors would be entitled to 
sue CRAs for incon-ect ratings directly. 160 Additional amendments have been made, inter 
alia, to establish a board as a middleman between issuers and CRAs. This board would be 
allocating a specific rating request to a rating agency of its choice, to both avoiding 
conflicts of interest between issuers and CRAs and enhancing independence. 16 1 
The United States is at least one step ahead of the rest of the world with their (suggested) 
regulation. This paper argues that this approach goes slightly over the top. The cuiTent 
proposal is a logical reaction on the Subprime Crisis and identified risks in relation to 
CRAs. Therefore the author welcomes the establishment of a new authority and enhanced 
disclosure standards. Yet, implementing a middleman, like the above board, interferes too 
vigorously with self-autonomy of CRAs and issuers. The idea of free markets 1s 
definitely jeopardized, if market participants have no longer a choice to contract. 
C Comparison to the European Union 
1 The European view on the regulation of CRAs and their approach 
In late 2004 the view of the European Commission was that the existing directives 
"combined with self-regulation on the basis of International Organization of Securities 
Commission (IOSCO) Code" would be sufficient to deal adequately with all emerging 
issues. 162 In the recent years the European Commission has performed a volte-face 
though, self-regulation has been not longer considered adequate "in face of the 2007 
financial firesto1m". 16·1 The cun-ent approach seems now to be largely influenced by the 
United States Credit Rating Agency Reform Act 2006 and the cu1Tent refo,m bill. 
In the European Union appropriate regulation was first enacted in September 2009 with 
the European Regulation on Credit Rating Agencies to harmonise the different 
approaches of European countries to deal with CRAs in the European Union. 1<>1 The 
160 
161 
162 
16.1 
164 
fbid; Wolverson, above n 31, ibid. 
Ibid. 
Parker and Bake, above n I 06, at 40 I; the existing directives refe1Ted to : the Market Abuse 
Directive (MAD) and the Capital Requirement Directive (CRD). 
Ibid, at 402. 
Regulation 1060/2009 on credit rating agencies [2009] OJ L 302. 
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Regulation lays down a couple of standards in relation to CRAs' behaviour and corporate 
governance.
165 In fact, the Regulation builds upon the IOSCO Code of Conduct, by 
addressing many issues which the IOSCO Code of Conduct already contains. Yet it goes 
even fm1her in some points, by enhancing transparency and introducing supervision as 
well as by setting legally binding standards. !6(, 
In detail, the Regulation establishes a registration system for credit rating agencies.
167 It 
further requires compliance with several standards in relation to independence, conflicts 
of interest, employees and analysts, methodologies and models, outsourcing, and 
disclosure and presentation of infoimation.
168 Some financial institutions are only allowed 
to use credit ratings for regulatory purposes, if, in general, credit ratings have been issued 
by a properly registered CRA.
169 In cases of non-compliance, a withdrawal of the 
registration is possible. 170 
Most recently the European Commission has gone a step further. Due to the latest 
"contribution" of CRAs to the bad situation in Greece and the destabilisation of the Euro, 
the European Commission is aiming at centralising the oversight of CRAs.
171 The 
designated body might be the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), 
which was established in 2009 and "is due to come into force at the start of 2011 ". 
172 
Essential powers of this body would include a proper enforcement system for cases, if 
CRAs do not comply with their duties. For example, if there is a conflict of interest, the 
body would be entitled to issue a warning, fine the CRA or in the worst case withdraw 
the registration. Another important power would be to have the right to investigate and to 
perforn1 inspections.
173 
Due to its similarities, this approach seems to be aligned with the cu1Tent strive of the 
United States to establish a separate body within the SEC with appropriate powers. In 
contrast to the United States though , the European Union is, besides , considering plans to 
"create a regional [European] credit rating agency". This specific CRA, being under the 
165 
166 
167 
168 
169 
170 
171 
172 
173 
Parker and Bake, above n 106, ibid . 
See ibid; European Commission "Commission adopts proposal to regulate cred it rating agencies" 
( 12 November 2008) Press Release IP/08/1684 <www.ec.europa.eu >. 
Regulation I 060/2009 on credit rating agencies [2009] OJ L 302/14ff. 
Regulation I 060/2009 on cred it rating agencies [2009] OJ L 302/23 (Annex I). 
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supervision of, for instance, the European Central Bank (ECB), could then compete with 
the big three and allegedly lead to more competition, not to forget more transparency.
174 
Again, the author welcomes most of the regulatory measures, but by far not all. Similar to 
plans of the United States the plan of the European Union to set up their own CRA is a 
step in the wrong direction, clearly undennining the notion of competition. Despite a lack 
of competition in the "CRA market", rutificial interventions by governments have to be 
avoided. Otherwise, theoretically, the ultimate consequence might be that each 
government establishes its own CRA. That is clearly far from desirable. This paper hence 
proposes another approach in order to open the market for more and other existing 
CRAs.175 First, thresholds should be lowered, such as making it easier and less expensive 
for smaller CRAs to comply with regulation. Secondly, governments should admit more 
smaller CRAs to provide credit ratings for regulatory purposes . 
2 The implementation in the United Kingdom 
In the United Kingdom the Credit Rating Agencies Regulations 20 I O crune into force on 
7 June 2010. According to the Regulations the responsible authority for CRAs in the 
United Kingdom is the Financial Services Authority (FSA)
176 This authority has, inter 
alia, the investigatory powers , described above.
177 
The correspondent competent authority in New Zealand with comprehensive powers 
could be the announced new super regulator, the Financial Mru·kets Authority (FMA), if 
the New Zealand Government finally decides to step in to regulate . 
D Comparison to Australia 
A look across the Tasman shows that Australia has aligned its regulation of CRAs with 
the IOSCO Code of Conduct and has tried to catch up with regulation in major mru·kets, 
such as the United States or Europe. 178 The Australian regulation focuses on licencing of 
CRAs and is embedded in the Co1porations Act 2001.
179 
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179 
Ibid . 
Bowen, above n 31 , ibid . 
Regulation I 060/2009 on credit rating agencies [2009] OJ L 302/17. 
Regulation I 060/2009 on credit rating agencies [2009] OJ L 302/17 and 2 1. 
Austra li an Securities and Inves tments Commiss ion, above n 156, ibid . 
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CRAs are from 1 Januaiy 20 I O required to hold an Australian Financial services (AFS) 
licence. 180 To comply with the "general licencee obligations" , CRAs must, inter alia:
181 
manage conflicts of interest that may arise; have adequate resources for the "nature, scale 
and complexity of their businesses"; ensure their employed credit analysts are highly 
trained and competent to prepare credit ratings; ensure best practice, provide credit rating 
services "efficiently, honestly and fairly"; and have risk management systems in place. 
Apru1 from these general obligations, CRAs must comply with a fm1her requirement, if 
they provide credit ratings for investment products that are offered to consumers.
182 In 
this case CRAs are required to implement a dispute resolution system. Another catego1y 
of obligations, which the ASIC imposes on CRAs are specially tailored conditions. 
Examples are: the mandatory compliance with the IOSCO Code of Conduct, the 
disclosure of procedures, methodologies and assumptions for ratings and a review system 
of credit ratings. 183 
Unlike the United States and the European Union , Australia seems to strike a balance 
between regulation and self-regulation, namely the rights at stake and the different 
interests of market pai1icipants . This is a fact, which this paper embraces. Australia 
shows a rather reluctant approach with regard to investigato1y powers , but by requiring 
CRAs to implement the dispute resolution system, it pays pru1icular attention to consumer 
rights. 
E Conclusion 
Governments worldwide tend to jettison the long dominating self-regulation of CRAs. 
The examples underpin the regulato1y effo11 to introduce registration and supervision 
models, comprising efficient enforcement methods for cases of non-compliance. 
Undoubtedly, issues like conflicts of interest and transparency are identified and high on 
the agenda. In the long run newly announced or yet passed regulation aims at increased 
investor protection and stabilised financial markets. The author generally embraces this 
approach, but considers some measures suggested by the United States and the European 
Union a bit over the top. As a result New Zealand is well advised to orient itself towards 
Canada and in pa11icular Australia with their more balanced approaches. Nevel1heless, 
180 Ibid . 
18 1 Ibid. 
182 Ibid. 
18.1 Ibid . 
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the Government should be using the most experienced markets like the United States and 
the European Union as guidelines and finally aim at a sound degree of interference. 
V Conclusion 
This paper recommends the New Zealand Government to step in to regulate CRAs. The 
right approach to deal appropriately with CRAs has been questionable for a long time. 
Governments and regulators worldwide have discussed different options , reaching from 
self-regulation and the New Zealand "wait and see"- approach to comprehensive 
regulatory measures, as taken by the United States and the European Union. The author 
argues that self-regulation has clearly failed. The IOSCO Code of Conduct was a 
beginning, but inevitably lacks of a proper enforcement procedure. 
New Zealand Guidelines for non-bank deposit takers, set up by the Reserve Bank of New 
Zealand, were a first short step in the right direction , but by far not sufficient to cope with 
the cmTent issues and 1isks. Diverse fundamental rights and principles are impaired, in 
particular consumer protection and financial stability. They lastly justify New Zealand's 
interference. The Government is well advised to keep pace with the bigger markets in the 
United States and the European Union. Adopted regulation should be in essential points 
aligned with international approaches. Globalisation in financial markets demands for 
global regulatory consistency. 
The Government should implement effective and legally binding regulatory measures. To 
meet this aim, regulation should be p1incipally in accordance with the Australian and/or 
the Canadian requirements, CRAs have to: apply for a regi stration , which is revocable in 
cases of non-compliance with the following requirements ; manage conflicts of interest; 
employ highly trained and competent staff; comply with enhanced info1mation and 
transparency standards; ensure mandatory compliance with the IOSCO Code of Conduct; 
have a review system of credit ratings; and ensure best practice. Through the registration 
requirement, New Zealand is able to go around the hurdle, that most CRAs do not have 
their headqum1ers or even subsidiaries in New Zealand. In this way regulatory measures 
become legally binding and enforceable. The super-regulator FMA, as counterpa1t of the 
SEC and the ESMA, might be the competent body to deal with the resulting ongoing 
supervision of CRAs and enforcement of appropriate regulation. 
However, the issues in relation to CRAs cannot be resolved solely with regulato1y 
measures . The Government should broaden the view on other cmcial factors , which this 
paper has identified: educational measures have to be implemented to increase financial 
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literacy of New Zealand's consumers ; financial ad visors and other sellers of investment 
products should also be facing stlicter regulation, preventing a one-sided use of credit 
ratings for marketing and sale purposes. 
This paper has identified a challenging task for the New Zealand Government to tailor 
appropriate regulation. Due to the tremendous relevance of CRAs for the public and the 
modem financial markets, effective, comprehensive and timely regulation is required.
184 
The author agrees with Blaurock, saying that there is no room for laissez-faire, as market 
powers were not capable to fulfil their function and cope with the emerging risks 
adequately: " regulatory action is necessary" . 185 
184 
185 
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